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H ISTORICALLY, labor costs have represented the largest cost component of the transportation industry. The industry is 
heavily unionized, and transport workers generally receive higher 
wages than the average industrial worker. Under federal economic 
regulation, carriers had little incentive to bargain hard to keep labor 
costs low. Restrictive entry policies and collective ratemaking resulted 
in near-uniform pricing among competitors. Increased labor costs 
were merely passed on to the consumers of transport services. 
The advent of deregulation greatly changed the nature and level of 
competition in the transportation industry, as well as its structure. 
The number of certificated airlines increased from 29 in 1978 to 
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approximately 180 by 1986.1 The number of trU<;king firms subject to 
Interstate Commerce Commission regulation increased from approxi-
mately 18,000 in 1980 t~ more than 30,000 by 1984.2 Most of the new 
airlines and motor carriers were nonunion operators who enjoyed a 
significant cost advantage over existing carriers. 
The influx of new, low-cost competitors, in conjunction with the 
pricing freedoms granted by Congress and the regulatory agencies, has 
had an adverse effect on the financial performance of the air and 
trucking industries. More than 120 airlines-large and small-have 
gone bankrupt since 1978.3 Though its profits have generally 
improved since deregulation in 1980, the railroad industry has also 
experienced significant structural change, including major bankrupt-
cies and the downsizing of carriers through abandonment and divesti-
ture of track and facilities. 
Ironically, given the pro-competition objective of deregulation, 
merger activity and industry concentration in each of the three modes 
of transportation have also increased. The five largest airlines have 
nearly 60 percent of the total domestic air passenger market, while the 
seven largest railroads generate more than 85 percent of industry 
revenues.4 The financial pressures created by increased competition 
from low-cost, nonunion carriers, and the labor impacts of industry 
consolidation have produced some unprecedented responses from 
unions and management. 
The question of how competition would affect union participation 
and strength was misunderstood, as evidenced by a 1980 study that 
concluded, "airline collective bargaining structure should continue to 
reflect the continued impact of the former regulatory structure."5 
Clearly this conclusion has not borne up to close scrutiny during the 
past 10 years. Economists and policy makers failed to predict the 
impact of increased competition on labor relations in transportation. 
This article examines some of deregulation's unintended effects in this 
realm. 
1. Frederick]. Stephenson, Jr., Transportation U.S.A. (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley 
Publishing Company, 1987), p. 373. 
2. Peter A. Susser, "The Labor Impact of Deregulation," Employment Relations Today 
(Summer 1986): 118-119. 
3. Mary Lu Carnevale, "Presidential Air to End Pact Feb. 6 as Feeder for Continental 
at Dulles," Wall Street journal (January 11, 1988), p. 8. 
4. Chuck Hawkins and Aaron Bernstein, "Airlines in Flux: And Then There Were 
Five?" Business Week (March 10, 1986): 107; Stephenson, pp. 128-129. 
5. Reuben Kyle and Laurence Phillips, "Airline Deregulation: Did Economists Prom-
ise Too Much or Too Little?" Logistics and Transportation Review 21, no. 1 (1984): 17. 
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Major developments in labor relations and policy have occurred in 
three distinct areas: corporate strategy, collective ·bargaining, and 
federal labor protection policies. Transportation firms have imple-
mented three controversial corporate strategies in an effort to reduce 
labor costs: Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceedings as a means to 
abrogate labor contracts, the creation of nonunion subsidiaries by 
union carriers, and outsourcing of various functions previously per-
formed in-house. These strategies (and the courts' receptiveness to 
them) have prompted Congressional action to addr.ess labor's concerns 
about long-term ramifications for the collective bargaining process. 
While transportation fir:m,s were not the first to use these strategies, it 
is obvious that their involvement has been a major factor in the 
renewed and increased interest of both labor and Congress in the 
philosophic and legal issues surrounding them. 6 
CHAPTER11BANKRUPTCY 
The use of bankruptcy proceedings to unilaterally abrogate or 
change collective bargaining agreements has frequently been chal-
lenged by labor in the courts. The source of the controversy lies in the 
conflict between Section 8(d) of the National Labor Relations Act, 
which stipulates that no party to a collective bargaining agreement 
may terminate or modify such an agreement except through proce-
dures delineated within that act and Section 365(a) of the Bankruptcy 
Reform Act of 1978, which permits the firm in reorganization to 
unilaterally reject executory contracts subject to bankruptcy court 
approval. Although federal courts have consistently held labor agree-
ments to be executory contracts not immune from Section 365(a), the 
criteria used to determine when to allow their rejection have generally 
been more stringent than those applied to ordinary executory con-
tracts.7 
In 1983 when Continental Airlines filed for Chapter 11 bankrupt-
cy, the criteria in effect were those employed in the 1981 case National 
Labor Relations Board v. Bildisco & Bildisco. The Bildisco test 
requires the firm in Chapter 11 proceedings to demonstrate that the 
continuation of the collective bargaining agreements would be burden-
6. Mark S. Pulliam, "The Collision of Labor and Bankruptcy Law: Bi/disco and the 
Legislative Response," Labor Law journal 36, no. 7 (July 1985): 395. 
7. Douglas Bordewieck and Vern Countryman, "The Rejection of Collective Bargain-
ing Agreements by Chapter 11 Debtors," American Bankruptcy Law journal 57 (October, 
1983): 315-317. 
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some to the estate (not necessarily fatal to the n;organization scheme) 
and that rejection of these agreements would assist the reorganiza-
tion.8 Additionally, the firm must make a factual presentation suffi-
cient to allow the bankruptcy court to weigh the competing equities.9 
The Supreme Court, on February 22, 1984, upheld the Bildisco 
standards, and also held that the firm does not commit an unfair labor 
practice by unilaterally rejecting or changing the terms of a collective 
bargaining agreement after the bankruptcy petition has been filed but 
prior to the bankruptcy court's formal authorization of rejection. 10 
The Supreme Court's decision created a strong labor protest and 
prompted Congress to, take immediate action. The Bankruptcy Amend-
ments and Federal Judgeship Law of 1984 essentially preserves the 
standards for rejection established in Bildisco, but seemingly increases the 
bargaining obligation of the firm in bankruptcy. In addition, the act 
requires bankruptcy court approval before rejection can take place. 11 The 
requirement that court permission be obtained prior to rejection should 
increase the bargaining strength of labor, but the legislation contains 
many ambiguous or ill-defined phrases, the interpretation of which may 
render the law an ineffective safeguard against labor contract abrogation. 
The likely effect, however, is to make Chapter 11 filing a less tenable, 
therefore a less desirable, strategy. 
THE ESTABLISHMENT OF NONUNION SUBSIDIARIES 
Unionized companies in the airline and motor carrier industries 
have successfully employed the strategy of establishing nonunion 
subsidiaries to reduce labor costs. New York Air and Frontier 
Horizons, subsidiaries of Texas Air Corporation and Frontier Air-
lines, Inc., respectively, represent two recent examples of this strategy 
in the airlines. In the motor carrier industry, "double-breasting" 
proliferated to the point that one of the major goals of the Teamsters' 
8. Ibid., and Charles M. Roesch, "Collective Bargaining Agreements and the Bank-
ruptcy Reform Act: What Test Should the Bankruptcy Court Use in Deciding Whether to 
Allow a Debtor to Reject a Collective Bargaining Agreement?" University of Cincinnati Law 
Review 51 (1982): 863. 
9. The "balancing of equities" requires consideration of several factors. For details on 
these factors see Harvey Miller and Peter A. Langerman, "Once More Into the Breach?" 
Management Focus 31, no. 3 (May/June 1984): 14. 
10. Pulliam, p. 392. 
11. William A. Wines, "An Overview of the 1984 Bankruptcy Amendments: Some 
Modest Protection for Labor Agreements," Labor Law journal 36, no. 12 (December 1985 ): 
914. 
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Union in its last national labor contract negotiations. was to stop the 
further creation of nonunion trucking operations.12 Carriers adopting 
this strategy should be aware of the potential problems and issues 
involved. 
Any carrier that creates a "dual company" may potentially 
encounter problems with secondary boycotts or alleged violations of 
collective bargaining agreements. Cases involving secondary boycotts 
generally center on the issue of whether the dual company is a "single 
employer." A finding that the firm is a single employer legally allows 
the union to picket the nonunion subsidiary. If the dual company is 
also found to be a "single bargaining unit," the company may be 
forced to recognize the union as the exclusive bargaining agent of all 
similarly situated e~ployees in subsidiaries or divisions owned or 
controlled by the employer. 13 
In determining whether a dual company is a single employer, the 
following criteria are used: interrelation of operations, common 
management, centralized control of labor relations, and common 
ownership. Of these criteria, the centralized control of labor relations 
usually receives the most careful scrutiny while common ownership is 
the least important criterion. Historically, the National Labor Rela-
tions Board (NLRB) has been more receptive to the nonunion 
subsidiary strategy than have the courts. 
The criteria and standards developed by the NLRB and courts for 
determination of single employer status have been used almost without 
revision in double-breasting cases. Double-breasting cases also involve 
the determination of an appropriate bargaining unit. In order for the 
dual company to be declared a single bargaining unit, it must first be 
found to be a single employer. 
The primary consideration in double-breasting cases is the com-
munity of interest among employees of the firm's component parts. If 
the nonunion subsidiary does not compete for the same customers or 
jobs as the unionized component, the NLRB and courts are not likely 
to find the dual company a single bargaining unit. Some competition 
between union and nonunion subsidiaries is permitted. The degree or 
12. "Teamster Contract Talks Focus on Job Protection, Non-Union Operations," 
Traffic World (February 4, 1985): 12. 
13. John M. Husband and T.J. Thompson, "Establishing and Operating Both Union 
and Nonunion Subsidiaries: A Trap for the Unwary," Labor Law journal 34, no. 6 (June 
1983): 332-333. 
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extent of allowable competition has not, ho'Y"ever, been clearly 
defined. 14 
The issues surrounding nonunion subsidiaries have captured the 
interest of Congress, which is in the process of drafting a bill that 
would greatly curtail the use of the dual-shop strategy. The construc-
tion industry seems to be the target of this measure. Consequently, the 
motor carrier and airline industries are not likely to fall under the 
bill's purview. 15 Nonetheless, carriers must be cognizant of potential 
legal issues and constraints that may prevent future successful imple-
mentation of the dual-shop strategy. 
OUTSOURCING 
A relatively new strategy that has drawn strong protests from 
transportation unions is outsourcing, or contracting out service or 
work typically performed by the carrier's employees. A recent exam-
ple of this strategy is the Burlington Northern Railroad's (BN) 
decision to lease locomotive power and contract out part of its 
locomotive maintenance. The Illinois Central Gulf Railroad had a 
similar but temporary arrangement with an outside contractor. Such 
arrangements conserve railroad capital and make available state-
of-the-art equipment (and skills needed to maintain it). Additionally, 
railroad shops have become increasingly expensive to operate, making 
outsourcing an attractive alternative.16 
BN's unions asked the company to negotiate the issue. When the 
carrier refused, the unions threatened to employ self-help, such as 
picketing, work stoppages, or strikes. The railroad successfully sought 
a court injunction against self-help in December 1986, and was itself 
enjoined from further outsourcing activity while the court considered 
the case. The court asked the Special Adjustment Board, an arm of the 
National Railway Adjustment Board established under the Railway 
Labor Act, to settle the dispute. The Board ruled in July 1987 that it 
had no jurisdiction over the case, and the injunction was extendedY 
The injunction was still in effect in late 1987.18 
14. Ibid., p. 334. 
15. Thomas M. Stroh, "Trucking Will Not Come Under Dual-Shop Prohibitions," 
Transport Topics (May 25, 1987): 1, 3. 
16. Gus Welty, "Labor Issues Will Heat Up," Railway Age (December 1986): 36. 
17. Greg Borza, "Ban on Union Self-Help Extended by U.S. Judge in Rail Mainte-
nance Case," Traffic World (July 27, 1987): 60. 
18. Andrea Chancellor, "Railroad-Union Dispute Still Pending in Court," journal of 
Commerce. (September 18, 1987), p. 4B. 
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As the legality of outsourcing appears to depend heavily on the 
terms of existing labor agreements, it is likely that the issue will be a 
key one in upcoming rail contract negotiations. Airlines have 
expressed interest in the strategy as well. Eastern Airlines announced 
plans in June 1987 to spin off a subsidiary to perform its ground 
service work at airports around the country but was enjoined from 
doing so. American Airlines has a similar subsidiary, and different 
functions have been contracted out by a number of other airlines. 19 
TWO-TIER WAGE STRUCTURES 
In the area of colleCtive bargaining, two-tier wage pacts and 
employee participation programs are two of the most notable recent 
developments in transportation. High unemployment in the airline 
industry, the companies' financial difficulties stemming from the 
recession, and the intense competition with nonunion subsidiaries 
convinced unions representing employees of major airlines that con-
cession bargaining was necessary. Two-tier wage structures, in which 
the top rate of pay for new employees is substantially lower than that 
for more senior employees, were the easiest form of concession for 
unions to grant since the entire burden of the lower tier was placed on 
prospective workers. All of which, as William Winpisinger, president 
of the International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Work-
ers, noted in 1985, "puts the union in the awkward position of 
discriminating against its unborn members."20 
American Airlines pioneered the two-tier wage system for the 
airline industry in 1983 in an effort to bring its labor costs more in line 
with those of low-cost competitors such as Continental. The early 
financial results of American's experiment were gratifying. The first 
year of the two-tier system resulted in $100 million savings-6.7 
percent of the company's total costs. By 1985, 25 percent of Ameri-
can's 26,400 workers were in the lower tier or "B" scale. By 1990 the 
company projects that 50 percent of their workforce will be "B" 
scalers.21 Other airline executives, impressed with American's num-
19. "Eastern Airlines Planning Spinoff To Perform Ground Service Work," journal of 
Commerce (June 26, 1987), p. 5B. 
20. Irwin Ross, "Employers Win Big in the Move to Two-Tier Pay Spreads, but the 
Pioneer Firms Encounter Problems," Wall Street journal (October 14, 1985), p. 1. 
21. David Wessel, "Split Personality: Two-Tier Pay Spreads, but the Pioneer Firms 
Encounter Problems," Wall Street journal (October 14, 1985), p. 1. 
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TABLE I-TWO-TIER CONTRACTS IN MAJO~ AIRLINES 
Approx. Pay 
Employee Reduction 
Group Carrier Year of Parity (In Percent) 
Pilots: Aloha 5 15 
American to 35 
Delta 5 35 
Eastern 5 14-43 
Frontier 6 10 
Piedmont Captains-3 21 
Officers-none 28 
Republic Future negotiations 11 
Trans World Future negotiations 15 
United Future negotiations 34-50 
'USAir 5 40-45 
Western Does not reach parity 25 
Attendants: American 17 35 
Frontier Does not reach parity 5-10 
Northwest 5 21-50 
Pan Am Does not reach parity 35 
Piedmont 6 20 
Republic Future negotiations 30 
United 6 20-25 
US Air 6 20-30 
Western Does not reach parity 25 after fifth year 
Mechanics: Aloha 6 25 
American 12.5 40-45 
Frontier 5 35 
Northwest 5 21-50 
Piedmont 6 20 
Republic 3.5 25 
Trans World 6 20 
United 5 25 
US Air 5 24 
Western 6 25 
Sources: AIR Conference, March 1, 1986; Robert C. Lieb and James F. Molloy, "The Major 
Airlines: Labor Relations in Transition," Transportation journal, Spring, 1987, pp. 17 -29; 
Agis Salpukas, "The Two-tier Wage System is Found to be Two-Edged Sword By Industry," 
New York Times, July 21, 1987, pp. 1, 22-23D. 
hers, followed suit. By mid-1987, 70 percent of all airline labor 
contracts had two-tier wage provisions (Table 1).22 
"A" Versus "B" Scalers 
Recent experience with two-tier pacts indicates two critical points: 
the length of time until the two tiers merge and wage parity is reached, 
22. Robert C. Lieb and James F. Molloy, "The Major Airlines: Labor Relations in 
Transition," Transportation journal (Spring 1987): 17 -29; Agis Salpukas, "The Two-Tier 
Wage System is Found to Be Two-Edged Sword By Industry," New York Times (July 21, 
1987), p. D22. 
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and morale problems associated with having two "classes" of 
employees. Under American Airlines' original pacts with pilots and 
flight attendants, the "A" and "B" scales were never to have merged. 
This fact has been a major point of contention in recent contract 
negotiations. The pilots' contract negotiated in February 1987, after 
almost a year of talks, made it possible for a "B" scale pilot to reach 
wage parity with the "A" scale after 10 years. The flight attendants' 
union is still contesting the proposed 17 -year period for parity to be 
reached. 
Although all bargaining concessions are controversial, two-tier 
wage structures create. a special set of controversies. Because 
employees with the same job title and duties receive different wages for 
similar effort, the two-tier structure violates the basic tenet of equal 
pay for equal work. 
The following conflicts indicate that the two-tier wage system is a 
double-edged sword for the airline industry, and as such must be 
handled gingerly. 
Turnover. High pilot turnover and increasing difficulty recruit-
ing highly-qualified pilots have resulted in a reduction in flight 
qualification requirements at some airlines.23 
Restiveness and Resentment. The refusal by "B" scalers to 
perform certain in-flight tasks because "A" scalers are paid more for 
the same work could have passenger safety and service implications if 
the issue is not addressed. 24 
Reduced Worker Loyalty. Top-end employees speculate that 
management will get rid of them to reduce labor costs by replacing 
them with lower-paid second-tier employees.25 
Legal Challenges. Some questions may be raised about whether 
unions breach the duty of fair representation by negotiating two-tier 
wage provisions, particularly if the lower tier would be disproportion-
ately comprised of protected minority groups such as women and 
blacks.26 
23. Salpukas, "The Two-Tier Wage System." 
24. Shane R. Premeaux et a!., "The Two-Tier Wage System," Personnel Administrator 
31 (1986): 92-100. 
25. James E. Martin and Melanie M. Peterson, "Two-Tier Wage Structures: Implica-
tions for Equity Theory," Academy of Management journal 30, no. 2 (June 1987): 
297-315. 
26. John V. Jansonius and Kenneth E. Broughton, "Coping with Deregulation: 
Reduction of Labor Costs in the Airline Industry," journal of Air Law and Commerce 49, no. 
3 ( 1984 ): 501-553. 
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Potential Financial Losses. The Association of Professional 
Flight Attendants, the . union representing the flight attendants at 
American Airlines, has mounted a "corporate campaign" against 
Equitable Life Assurance Society in an effort to persuade policy 
holders and pension fund members to demand" ... that Equitable use 
its influence to get American Airlines to bargain fairly with its flight 
attendants and do away with two-tier.'m 
Unwarranted Industry Overexpansion. Some industry observers 
speculate that two-tier wage pacts provide airlines with the unwar-
ranted incentive to add employees and overexpand operations in an 
industry already plagued by excess capacity.28 
EMPLOYEE PARTICIPATION PROGRAMS 
The trend toward concession bargaining is a good example of how 
competition affects strategy for both management and labor. Strategies 
are likely to differ from carrier to carrier depending on the extent of 
competition, the carrier's financial condition, and management's view 
of the future. For railroads and motor carriers, where industry-wide 
bargaining was the rule, concessionary bargaining has taken hold 
more slowly than in the airline industry. Approximately 25 percent of 
organized railroad companies and 50 percent of long-haul trucking 
firms have secured wage concessions. 29 
The unions' bargaining power and their ability to win the quid 
pro quo in return for cost concessions depend on how important the 
concessions are for the firm. Where concessions are important, unions 
generally try to gain job security. Failing that, unions may demand 
improvements in other areas, perhaps a participative management 
program or equity in the firm through an employee stock ownership 
plan (ESOP). 
During the 1985 National Master Freight Agreement (NMF A) 
negotiations, an International Brotherhood of Teamsters survey 
showed that two-thirds of the rank-and-file membership opposed 
wage concessions. In an effort to assist failing carriers, Teamster 
leadership formulated an ESOP program, which, while not part of the 
27. Association of Professional Flight Attendants, "Is Your Equitable Insurance or 
Pension Fund Underwriting Catastrophe for Others"? Brochure, Summer 1987. 
28. Agis Salpukas, "The Two-Tier Wage Impact," New York Times (October 30, 
1985), p. Dl. 
29. Peter Capelli, "Competitive Pressures and Labor Relations in the Airline Indus-
try," unpublished working paper, February 1985, p. 5. 
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NMF A, gave individual companies a chance to reduce wages. While 
Teamster leaders did not expect that ESOPs would prevent the 
eventual bankruptcies of financially weak firms, the plan helped 
preserve Teamster jobs in those companies for a period of time. In the 
1988 negotiations union leaders again must balance concerns of large 
company drivers for higher wages with job security interests of drivers 
at small carriers. The Teamster proposal would officially allow 
troubled companies to set up ESOPs in an effort to address this 
issue.30 In the airline industry, ESOPs play an important role. 
Employees own 25 percent of Eastern, 13 percent of Pan American, 
and owned 33 percent of Western and 15 percent of Republic before 
they were acquired by Delta and Northwest, respectively. 31 The 
attempt by the pilots' union to buy United Airlines was a major factor 
in that company's reorganization of top management. 32 
The railroad industry has not had much success in initiating 
employee incentive programs, although declining employment and 
technical change has sparked interest in some forms of employee 
participation. Programs tend to emphasize problem-solving and deci-
sion-making processes such as task forces, labor-management commit-
tees, and quality circles. These programs appear to be implemented 
most frequently in railroads facing financial problems. The Milwau-
kee Road Quality Circle Project provides an excellent illustration of a 
successful program implemented in a financially weak company. 33 
Several types of barriers appear to interfere with satisfactory 
implementation of employee involvement programs. Because of their 
departure from traditional labor management relationships it may be 
difficult to institutionalize programs into the organization. One 
indication of a program's acceptance, or lack thereof is the extent to 
which middle managers are involved in the successful implementation 
of the program. Too often they find themselves squeezed between 
upper levels of management and rank-and-file workers as many 
traditional middle management tasks become potential subjects of 
group decision-making processes. 
30. Aaron Bernstein, "The Teamsters: A Break in Forty Miles of Bad Road," Business 
Week (March 21, 1988): 90. 
31. Capelli, "Competitive Pressures and Labor Relations," p. 18. 
32. "Cancelled Flight: Allegis Shakeup Came as Stockholder Ire Put Board Tenure in 
Doubt," Wall Street Journal (June 11, 1987), pp. 1, 22. 
33. See, for example, Ellen Foster Curtis, "Quality Circles in Transportation: The 
Milwaukee Road Experience," Transportation fournal23, no. 3 (Spring 1984): 63-69. 
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Union perceptions as conveyed to rank-and-file workers are 
another potential barrier to the continued success of an employee 
involvement program. If the program smacks of an attempt to 
undermine the union, or appears to be a way to squeeze more 
productivity from workers in exchange for little tangible gain, the 
program is doomed from the start. The question may arise over 
whether employee involvement will last only until better economic 
times return to the company, at which time management will wrest 
decision-making authority from cooperative programs. Unfortunately 
the demise of Eastern Airlines' long successful employee involvement 
plan tends to support this type of concern. 
Another potential stumbling block for employee involvement 
programs is the desire on the part of executives for quickly ascertain-
able, quantifiable results. Excessive emphasis on quick fixes can result 
in rapid disillusionment for everyone involved in the project. Many of 
the benefits that accrue from employee involvement manifest them-
selves in improved morale and a better work environment. A relatively 
long time may elapse before actual dollar savings become evident. 
By and large, employee involvement programs in the transporta-
tion industry have not met with great success in terms of financial 
results or in improved long-term labor-management relations. Per-
haps this is due to the fact that in most cases, programs began as 
last-ditch efforts to reverse financial losses. This may prove especially 
true in employee stock ownership plans. In the trucking and airline 
industries, ESOPs were established to stave off financial failure. This 
was not the reason for which Congress enacted the legislation that 
made ESOPs possible. In a recent survey of over 100 companies, 
conducted by the National Center for Employee Ownership, only one 
firm required wage concessions as a prerequisite for the formation of 
an ESOP. The report continues: 
While it is true that some ESOPs have been used as a last-ditch effort to 
save failing businesses, prevent hostile takeovers, or even induce 
employees to make wage concessions, the U.S. General Accounting 
Office reports that such cases account for only about 3 percent of all 
company plans ... . By and large, then, ESOPs are started for the 
purposes Congress intended-such as allowing employees to become 
owners of profitable, closely held companies when a principal owner 
retires ... or as an additional employee benefit. 34 
34. Corey Rosen and Michael Quarrey, "How Well is Employee Ownership Work-
ing?" Harvard Business Review (September-October 1987): 126. 
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LABOR PROTECTION ISSUES 
371 
Prior to economic deregulation, the Interstate Commerce Com-
mission (ICC) and the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) routinely 
imposed labor protective conditions upon approved railroad and 
airline mergers, consolidations, acquisitions, and other carrier trans-
actions. 
The first statute to protect employees affected by railroad consoli-
dations was the Emergency Railroad Transportation Act of 1933. 
Before its expiration in 1936, rail labor and management negotiated 
what remains to this day the basis for railroad labor protection-the 
Washington Job Protection Agreement of May 1936.35 In 1940 the 
Interstate Commerce Act was amended to require the ICC to impose 
labor protection as a condition for approval of mergers, consolidations, 
line abandonments, and other similar transactions. Over the years the 
ICC developed and imposed a variety of formulae that specified 
compensation for employees who lost their jobs, were bumped to 
lower-paying jobs, or had to relocate to retain employment. 
The CAB imposed similar conditions as a prerequisite for approv-
ing comparable airline transactions. Though the Civil Aeronautics 
Act of 1938 did not explicitly mandate such a requirement, the federal 
courts agreed that labor protection was inherent within the CAB's 
authority. The CAB's conditions generally mirrored those developed 
in the railroad industry, but were often modified as dictated by 
industry conditions.36 These conditions were substantial as they 
generally guaranteed long-term employees they would be no worse off 
for at least 4 years after the transaction. 
The degree of job protection provided railroad and airline 
employees affected by mergers, consolidations, etc., was unequalled in 
any other industry. Since deregulation, however, the labor protection 
posture of the regulatory agencies has changed significantly. The U.S. 
Department of Transportation (DOT), which assumed regulatory 
authority over airline mergers after the CAB was abolished, has not 
imposed labor protective conditions on any airline merger. The ICC 
has elected not to impose labor conditions on short-line railroads, those 
railroads created from the divested lines of major carriers. These 
35. Paul Stephen Dempsey and William E. Thoms, Law and Economic Regulation in 
Transportation (Westport, CT: Quorum Books, 1986), p. 302. 
36. Herbert R. Northrup, "Airline Labor Protective Provisions: An Economic Analy-
sis," Journal of Air Law and Commerce 53, no. 3 (Winter 1987): 408. 
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developments have been challenged by labor in th~ courts, and have 
prompted legislative action by Congress. 
Although the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 provides protec-
tion in the form of financial assistance to employees who lose their jobs 
because of dere.?ulation, Congress has never provided funds to effec-
tuate the plan.3 The act also gives employees with 4 or more years of 
tenure at an affected airline preferential hiring considerations at other 
airlines seeking new employees. 38 
Regardless of these statutory protection provisions, the advent of 
deregulation caused the CAB to alter its labor protection policy in 
merger cases. In the 1979 National Airlines Acquisition Case, the 
CAB announced it would order protective conditions only where 
required by "special circumstances." DOT continued this policy after 
the CAB was phased out and has not ordered labor protection clauses 
in any of the mergers it has reviewed. The key reasons for the change 
in policy are: (1) displaced employees now stand a greater chance of 
reemployment with another airline since deregulation removed signif-
icant institutional barriers to entry into the industry; and (2) the 
imposition of labor protection provisions could cause the purchasing 
carrier to cancel the transaction that would result in job losses, 
particularly in cases involving a financially troubled airline. 39 By 
virtue of a 1983 Department of Labor ruling, however, airline 
employees laid off because of mergers or acquisitions must be given the 
same rehiring preference as employees laid off for other reasons. 40 
Attempts to pass labor protection legislation in 1982 and 1986 
were defeated in the Senate. However, in October 1987 both the 
House of Representatives (H.R. 3051) and the Senate passed bills that 
would require the imposition of labor protective provisions as a 
condition of approval for airline mergers unless the projected costs of 
protection would exceed the anticipated financial benefits of the 
transaction. The Senate version would also transfer the authority for 
imposing labor protective provisions from DOT to the Department of 
Labor. The enactment of this legislation is expected to have a chilling 
effect on merger activity in the airline industry due to the substantial 
costs associated with the protective provisions.41 
37. Susser, p. 119. 
38. Northrup, p. 415. 
39. Ibid., pp. 416-417. 
40. Allen R. Wastier, "Supreme Court Lets Stand Rehiring-Preference Rule Used in 
Airline Mergers," Traffic World (October 12, 1987): 45. 
41. Northrup, pp. 404-405 and 455-459. 
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A similar development involving labor protection. has occurred in 
the railroad industry. Since 1982 the ICC has routinely been refusing 
to order labor protective conditions on line sales by larger railroads to 
regional, or short-line carriers. This is consistent with federal law that 
does not specifically require such conditions for approval of line sales 
as it does for rail merger and abandonment proceedings.42 Since 
deregulation, the number of short-line railroads has increased at a 
phenomenal rate. By 1987 more than 300 short-line carriers employ-
ing about 12 percent of the nation's total rail workers were in 
existence. 43 
Rail unions view the creation of short lines as the major carrier's 
primary strategy for reducing their labor forces without incurring 
substantial severance costs. The short-line spin-offs generally nego-
tiate lower wage scales and more flexible work rules, and employ 
fewer workers than did the larger carriers who previously operated 
their lines. Major railroads contend that they are selling lines that 
would otherwise be abandoned and, thus, fewer rail jobs are lost. The 
strike against the Pittsburgh & Lake Erie Railroad (P&LE), and the 
subsequent landmark court rulings in favor of labor, illustrate the rail 
unions' dissatisfaction with the ICC's refusal to impose protective 
conditions. 
The P&LE was a financially-troubled, 182-mile carrier with 750 
employees. It was in the process of being sold to the Chicago West 
Pullman Transportation Corp., which had announced intentions to 
reduce the work force to one-third of the current employees, when the 
workers struck. Initially, a federal district court judge issued an 
injunction against the strike since the ICC had approved the line sale 
without protective conditions. However, in late October 1987 a 
three-judge appeals court panel ruled that labor unions are free to 
strike the P&LE under the Norris-LaGuardia Act, if the carrier fails 
to negotiate with them over its planned sale. The appeals court 
remanded the case to the district court judge to determine whether the 
proposed changes in work rules and conditions would require similar 
negotiations under the Railway Labor Act. 
On November 23, the district court judge ruled that the Railway 
Labor Act supersedes the Interstate Commerce Act in matters involv-
42. David M. Cawthorne and Allen R. Wastier, "Labor Protection Legislation May 
Solve Shortline Sales Issue," Traffic World (September 1987): 4. 
43. Frank N. Wilner, "Labor Protection Moves Seen Stunting Growth of Short Lines," 
Traffic World (October 12, 1987): 4. 
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ing employees, and directed the P&LE to comply with provisions of 
the Railway Labor Act by resolving the dispute with labor. The judge 
enjoined the railroad from altering its pay rules and working condi-
tions until the dispute-resolution procedures outlined in the act were 
completed. On April 8, 1988, the 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals upheld 
the district court ruling. The 3rd Circuit Court's ruling has slowed 
some of the activity in rail line sales, and is likely to be appealed to the 
Supreme Court. 44 
Congress has also become involved in the short-line sales issue. 
The approved Senate bill that mandates labor protective conditions in 
airline mergers contains the wording of a proposed House bill (H.R. 
3332) that would require the ICC to impose conditions on track 
sales. 45 The proposed legislation establishes a sliding scale of buyouts 
for workers who lose their jobs as a result of the line sale and sets a 
$30,000 cap for the lump sum payment. Though these costs may be 
significant to a potential rail line purchaser, they are only a small 
fraction of the labor protection costs incurred in merger or abandon-
ment proceedings. The bill also contains a provision that appears to 
establish the primacy of the Railway Labor Act over the Interstate 
Commerce Act in line sales costs, a provision that will not be palatable 
to the railroad industry.46 
Another major reason for Congressional involvement in the 
short-line issue is the challenge labor has mounted against two of the 
ICC's decisions regarding establishment and usage of short-line 
sub~idiaries. The more recent decision permits the Burlington North-
ern Railroad to establish a subsidiary, the Winona Bridge Railway, 
which has trackage rights over 1 ,860 miles of BN main line. An earlier 
decision allowed Guilford Transportation Industries to transfer its 
Boston & Maine and Maine Central railroads to another of its 
subsidiaries, the Springfield Terminal Railway. The unions contend 
that the railroads' primary objective in these cases was to circumvent 
mandated procedures delineated in the Railway Labor Act by chang-
ing work rules and pay scales through the creation or use of a separate 
company that is not bound by existing union contracts. 47 
44. Paul F. Conley, "Labor of P&LE Short Line," Traffic World, April 18, 1988, pp. 
86-88. 
45. Northrup, p. 459. 
46. Cawthorne and Wastier, pp. 4-5. 
47. Allen R. Wastier and Kathleen R. Keeney, "Labor Feathers Ruffled Over BN 
Subsidiary Move," Traffic World (December 7, 1987): 7 -8; and HowardS. Abramson, "ICC 
Rejects Labor to Block BN Short Line," journal of Commerce (January 19, 1988), p. 3B. 
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Through their unwillingness to provide protection for workers 
adversely affected by airline mergers and rail line sales, some on-
lookers see DOT and the ICC as having abdicated their authority and 
involvement in dealing with labor matters. For their part, Congress 
appears to expect that management and labor will negotiate the labor 
terms of such transactions if the much needed industry and corporate 
restructurings are to continue. Toward that end, a more cooperative 
relationship between management and labor must be fostered to 
ensure successful negotiations. Under current adversarial conditions 
existing in the industries, progress will be difficult. 
"CONCLUSION 
Greater reliance on market forces has produced significant 
changes in structure, operations, and competitive relationships in 
transportation, changes that have affected management-labor rela-
tions in ways that economists and policy makers failed to predict in 
their pre-deregulation analyses. Both management and labor have 
altered their bargaining positions in response to their new environ-
ment. Transportation executives have used strategies such as Chapter 
11 bankruptcy, the formation of nonunion subsidiaries, and outsourc-
ing of certain functions to take a hard stand against increasing wage 
levels and for more flexible work rules. Many unions, having suffered 
a decline in membership and bargaining strength, and having recog-
nized the precarious financial condition of many transportation 
employers, have agreed to two-tier wage structures and other conces-
sions, sometimes in return for employee participation programs. 
Congress and the courts have been active in reinstating labor protec-
tion in airline mergers and rail line sales. These actions will have a 
significant impact on the ability of carriers to reshape their companies 
and their industries. 
This article has given a brief overview of some of the legal and 
operational challenges posed to transportation companies and unions 
by new approaches to labor relations and identified some of the 
potential issues that may arise as the industry continues to adapt to 
tremendous economic changes created by deregulation and competi-
tion. In order that both parties share in the burdens and benefits 
resulting from the new environment, it is apparent that more coopera-
tion is required in the severely tested labor-management relationship. 
